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Abstract 
In this article we aim at achieving trusted data collection from heterogeneous distributed sources including legacy systems and
human end users. We adopt an agent-like approach where we are able to send agents to host platforms connected to legacy 
systems. Functionality of agents may vary while we are solving the trust between host platforms, legacy systems and agents. We 
had not used any existing multi-agent system but we extended an existing production grade service platform called Jini and 
implemented agents above Jini services. The core of this work is about how we adopted the Jini platform to host agents. We also
provide examples about the implementation and integration of the platform in a real world example – a crisis management 
domain. We present our current achievements and plans concerning the implementation of the proposed platform. 
Keywords: trust; security; agent platform; remote code execution; process management 
1. Introduction 
One of the challenging demands of the nowadays distributed information systems is to collect information from 
legacy systems of various organizations and from human users in order to semi-automatically manage a business 
process or enact decisions on various management levels. This collection of information should be enacted in a 
secure manner through IP-based network while ensuring trust between both parties – information consumers as well 
as information providers. In a typical distributed application setting many actors participate in the process where the 
competences between all parties are explicitly defined. The gathering of information can be enacted either from 
legacy systems or from human end-users through electronic devices (computer, mobile device or handheld). Herein 
we present the design and implementation of a distributed system which fulfills all the above set goals. 
In the next chapter we set our main goal and define related objectives for the system we were trying to design. 
We found concepts of agents and multi agent systems (MAS) as the most appropriate technology to be used in order 
to fulfill our objectives. Unfortunately none of the available MAS was suitable for production-grade implementation 
of agents. We found out that a framework called Jini [1] has many of the features (some are described in [2]) we 
were looking for. Unfortunately Jini framework is more service-oriented than MAS. Therefore we had to extend the 
Jini and implement an agent-like platform above Jini services. The third chapter suggests identified subsystems and 
core agents needed in our platform. The fourth chapter briefly introduces the Jini framework and presents how we 
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had used Jini services to send and host agents. Examples of three core agents (most frequently used) are also 
introduced – an agent which delivers information from legacy information systems (IS), an agent for communicating 
with users and an agent which is able to configure IP devices. The viability of our platform is validated in a real 
crisis management infrastructure which is described in the fifth chapter. The last chapter concludes the article as 
well as presents our current achievements and plans concerning the implementation of the proposed platform.  
2. Objectives, challenges and requirements for the platform 
Our main goal is to design and implement a platform for distributed execution of agents for trusted data 
collection from distributed legacy systems and users where multiple actors are involved from various organizations 
with different competences and communicating over IP-based networks. In such settings the requirements exist for 
secure communication and trusted collection of data from various sources. The role of agents in such architecture is 
primarily coordinated collection of information. The gathering of information is enacted either from legacy systems 
or from human end-users through mobile devices by guided dialog. In respect to requirements the overall agent 
infrastructure must be a secure, robust and fail resistant system.  
2.1. Platform challenges 
Agent technology was selected due to the ability to fulfill such requirements through support of mobile and 
dynamically deployable executable code. We have decided to use agents for our platform in order to solve the 
following challenges: 
1. Obeying network failures – in case of temporal network failure, the agent code is still running and the results are 
sent when the connection to the network is back even for a small time period; 
2. Protecting sensitive data – management of centrally stored sensitive data is more convenient way for their 
protection presuming that such data are defended by cryptography facilities; 
3. Sensing remote events and monitoring – agents can be deployed on remote systems to track and monitor events; 
4. Handling unexpected events – agent code should not be able coping with exceptional events occurring during its 
execution. In such cases, the centrally managed agent system is able to react in more convenient way by issuing 
the other agents solving an exceptional state; 
5. Uploading code on demand – a way to upload a code with certain functionality to the agent’s host environment; 
6. Trust and security – trust must be established between the agent, host platform and any other systems 
communicating with the agent while communication between these entities must be secured. 
The most critical challenges among all the above mentioned ones are security and trust. According to [3] the 
platform from which an agent originates is referred to as the home platform, and normally is the most trusted 
environment for an agent. Agents are mainly executed on remote sites which provide the computational environment 
in which agents operate. We will refer to these sites as the host platforms (or agent platforms). There are certain 
security and trust risks which must be addressed between the host platform, agent and other systems (more details 
are discussed in [3]): 
x Host platform attacking the agent: The main requirements from the agent-side are laid out in respect to the 
“malicious host problem” [4] requiring isolated execution environment for agent execution preferring dedicated 
isolated hardware; means to attest the platform required in order to detect if the host platform is in trusted state. 
x The agent attacking the host platform: Reversely, a host platform has the following requirements in respect to 
agents: the agents must be executed in isolated environment, so they can not harm legacy systems. In order to 
track agents, any agent in the platform must be cryptographically signed. Only agents signed with trusted 
authority and assigned to selected category will be trusted by a host system. 
x The agent attacking another agent: It is required that any agent which will be used in the system will need to be 
audited and certified by a central authority. In turn, every host platform will be configured to execute only 
certified agents. These two security policies should ensure that malicious agents will not be deployed into the 
infrastructure. Only a breach of the set security policies might lead to potential agent-to-agent security risk. 
x Other entities attacking the agent system: Agents will also connect to the legacy systems (third party software). 
Therefore there exists a risk of an agent being attacked by a legacy system but also vice versa the risk of 
attacking legacy system by an agent. Another requirement arises from agents to the host platform is secure 
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protected connection to legacy systems. Physical security of network connection can be achieved either by direct 
cable connection of the host platform with legacy system or by managed network security.  
2.2. Agents and multi-agent systems 
The concept of an agent provides a convenient and powerful way to describe a complex software entity that is 
capable of acting with a certain degree of autonomy in order to accomplish tasks on behalf of its user. Unlike 
objects, which are defined in terms of methods and attributes, an agent is defined in terms of its behavior [5]. The 
definition for an agent according to the “Agent’s Bible” by Wooldridge and Jennings [6] is the following: “An agent 
is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this 
environment in order to meet its design objectives.” Depending on how an agent behaves many types of agents 
including reactive agents, knowledge-based agents, goal-based agents, problem solving agents, practical reasoning 
agents, utility based agent, intelligent agents or mobile agents were defined.  
In [8] Wooldridge and Jennings define a Multi-Agent System (MAS) as follows: “A set of agents that interacts in 
a common environment to achieve common or individual goals is called a multi-agent system (MAS)”. Agents in a 
MAS are typically capable of co-operating to solve problems that are beyond the abilities of any individual member. 
In a MAS agents attempt to satisfy collaborative global goals as well as their own local goals. MAS are often 
heterogeneous, i.e., composed of different kinds of agents having different roles, where the agents can share 
knowledge using any agreed language, for example using Knowledge Query Manipulation Language (KQML) or 
FIPA's Agent Communication Language (ACL). Moreover, in MAS the goal can be shared among the agents or 
alternatively the goal of agents can be managed by central designer system [7]. The agents in MAS have several 
important characteristics [8]: Autonomy: the agents are at least partially autonomous or fully autonomous; Local 
views: no agent has a full global view of the system, or the system is too complex for an agent to make practical use 
of such knowledge; and Decentralization: there is no designated controlling agent. 
2.3. Requirements for the platform 
Despite we had reviewed many agent platforms including Jade, Retsina, Aglets, Grasshopper and others, neither 
of them was suitable for production grade implementation of agents. Therefore we decided to look for a distributed 
platform already used in production systems which provides as required features as possible. The main of many 
requirements for our framework should follow the possibilities for a simple but powerful discovery mechanism, 
solved remote communication between entities, easy implementation of trust and security mechanisms, introducing 
as many distributed entities as required on demand, implementing mobile code and distributed management. 
Our main priority is therefore not to implement a fully FIPA-compliant agent but rather to fulfill our specific 
above stated requirements as well as possible. Unlike in MAS where the agents can manifest self-organization and 
complex behaviors, in our approach the organization of agents relies mostly on the decision made by semi-
centralized process management system. In our approach we do not implement any specific agent communication 
language but rather use the communication infrastructure of the used platform. If there exists some centralized 
coordination system the agents’ behavior might be viewed as merely sensors and effectors for executing 
environment. Anyhow we design our platform as centralized because any business process management requires 
centralized control. In our settings a problem needs to be solved in a distributed fashion either because a central 
controller is not permanently available or because one wants to avoid compromising or issue of resources. 
2.4. Jini – framework of our choice 
The homepage of Jini states the following: “Jini technology is a service oriented architecture that defines a 
programming model which both exploits and extends Java technology to enable the construction of secure, 
distributed systems consisting of federations of well-behaved network services and clients. Jini technology can be 
used to build adaptive network systems that are scalable, evolvable and flexible as typically required in dynamic 
computing environments.” Because of these statements, which more or less match our requirements, we have 
decided to adopt Jini platform to host our agents for distributed and trusted data collection. 
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In Fig. 1 we present the basic entities and basic model of Jini technology. In a running Jini system, there are three 
main players. There is a Service (Service Provider or Server), Client and a Lookup Service. All three components 
are connected by an IP based network. Code can be moved around between these three components. Service can be 
an implementation of any service. Client is generally interested in invoking the Service. Service can announce itself 
through uploading a special code called ServiceProxy (SP) to the Lookup Service. ServiceProxy is simply a proxy 
gateway to the original Service. A Client can download the ServiceProxy and through its invocation make use of the 
Service. Registrar is used as a reference object for both the Service and the Client. 
Fig. 1. The concept of Jini service invocation 
There are several things which can happen between the Client, the Service and the LookupService (LS): 
1. Discovery – Client discovers SP of a Service through LS either by unicast request, in case it knows the actual 
location of the LS, or by multicast discovery; 
2. Join - Once the LS is found it returns a Service Registrar (SR) object to the service to register the service in the 
LS. This includes the unique service ID, the proxy object of service implementation and service attributes; 
3. Searching for services - It is done by consulting the lookup catalog on the LS and matching suitable parameters 
of a service based on the type, name or service attributes. The LS will release a Java proxy object, which 
specifies how to connect service directly. This feature makes Jini more powerful than classic RMI that requires 
the service to know the location of the service deployment in advance; 
4. Leasing - Since Jini services will not necessarily be permanently available, the concept of leasing is introduced. 
When a service registers into some LS, a lease is granted for the certain time duration (or by default the lease is 
granted forever). If the service lease is granted for exact time duration, the lease needs to be periodically renewed 
in order to check a service is still alive. 
5. Object serialization - Jini serializes the Java objects in order to be sent across the network. This means that Java 
object can be accessed remotely as if it were local, as opposed to specifying service access protocols like in 
service oriented architectures (SOA). 
Using Jini framework usualy brings many improvements in comparison with SOA, but it suffers from some 
inconveniencies; i.e., the Jini event model does not guarantee the order of events occurring across a network, 
therefore the event messages are usually indexed. 
3. Subsystems and core agents 
In order to fulfill the architectural requirements set the infrastructure was decomposed into subsystems. These 
subsystems are related and will cooperate together using defined interfaces. The list of subsystems is given in the 
Table 1. 
2026 E. Gatial et al. / Procedia Computer Science 1 (2012) 2023–2032
 Emil Gatial at al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2010) 000–000  
Table 1. Subsystems of the architecture 
The purpose of the Distributed Secure Agent Platform (DSAP) is to provide an execution environment for 
different types of agents. The main aim of Process Management Subsystem (PMS) is execution of processes and 
coordination of involved agents in the emerged crisis situation. The plan scenario for each type of crisis situation 
will have to be pre-prepared in form of an abstract process. The exact execution of such plan in a concrete situation 
will depend on the context of the crisis situation. The agents available within the proposed infrastructure have to be 
stored on Trusted Servers, from which they can be requested for deployment on the side of HPs – this functionality 
is encompassed within the Agent Repository (AR). Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) will allow certifying, and 
subsequently verifying, all the objects deployed in the infrastructure. Agents will require information about the 
information sources which can be queried in order to retrieve information about resource availabilities. Resource 
Inquire System (RIS) will provide an interface which will provide such capability. Additionally there is a set of core 
agents which are required in order to ensure functionalities of the architecture. List of agents including their brief 
functionality description is in Table 2. 
Table 2. Core agents used in the architecture 
4. Extending JINI to host agents 
The following paragraph explains the agent code migration and agent lifecycle, while the next one introduces the 
security mechanisms of this agent platform. 
Since distributed algorithms were elaborated by computer science, the designed platform focuses merely on 
remote code execution with emphasis on establishing trust among multiple parties. Moreover, the agents in our 
scenario are designed to access resources in order to help a person to make a decision but not to make a decision 
autonomously. This does not express that the agents are meant to execute only simple code accessing resources (i.e. 
querying DB systems or temperature sensors). The selection of resources or resource providers can be optimized 
within the agent’s code, while a responsible person has a full control upon agent’s activities. Such optimizations of 
resource selection are beyond the focus of the agents described in this paper. According to [9] the platform from 
which an agent originates is referred to as the home platform and the platform where an agent’s execution takes 
place is called host platform (HP). In general, any party which wishes to join the implemented architecture and to 
provide information from their legacy systems or users must introduce a host platform for agents. We refer to such 
parties as host platform providers. One of the main focuses of designed agent platform is on securing and migration 
the agent from a home platform to a HP and on their mutual communication. 
Agent Functionality 
Information Delivery Agents (IDA) IDA agents will need to connect to legacy information systems of third parties to retrieve information about available resource capacities 
User Communication Agent (UCA) It communicates with users in a form of guided dialog through electronic device. Will include authentication and interface to 
authorization of the user. 
IP Agent (IPA) An agent able to configure IP devices such as routers. 
Subsystem Basic description and functionality 
Distributed Secure 
Agent Platform  
(DSAP) 
The core agent platform. 
It provides means for agent deployment, execution, migration and communication. 
Process Management 
Subsystem (PMS) Based on the plan collected from users. It will generate and execute a plan of activities. 
Agent Repository 
(AR) 
Database of system users, agents and their certificates. 
Process of accreditation of agents. 
Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) Certification and verification of agents, users and resources. 
Resource Inquire 
System (RIS) Giving the information which system to query for specific information. 
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DSAP is built upon the Java and Jini framework making use of the service proxy’s remote method call feature for 
modeling a HP. The HP, issuing an agent, locates possible service providers by querying LS(s) (either using known 
LS location or finding all possible LS by multicast) for specific DSAP service proxy. The DSAP services registered 
in LS usually hold additional service attributes (service metadata) like service location and service capabilities. The 
DSAP client discovers the right DSAP service implementation by matching the required service attributes with 
DSAP service attributes stored at LS and makes use DSAP proxy instance to access the HP. 
The lifecycle of agent emerges the following issues: 
x Finding suitable DSAP service in order to deploy an agent with specific goal. In order to successfully accomplish 
the goal of an agent, the suitable DSAP service has to be identified. One way how to successfully identify the 
suitable DSAP service deployment is to discover every DSAP service among LS and filter out the most 
appropriate service by service attributes’ matchmaking. This process includes comparison of DSAP service 
attributes with goal specific attributes of an agent. Such process should be done every time the agent has to be 
deployed, which leads to cumbersome and time consuming operations. Another way is to implement special kind 
of service whose special goal is to register event listener notifying a service attribute change among discovered 
available DSAP services. This kind of service should periodically discover new DSAP services or discard no 
longer available services. RIS service should implement methods searching for the most appropriate DSAP 
service according to specific criteria, for example to find the DSAP service deployed in the vicinity to given 
geographical location, etc. 
x Deployment of an agent in short- or long-term manner using DSAP client. The short-term agent deployment 
occurs in on-demand information acquisition where an agent responds almost immediately to a DSAP client with 
return messages. Typically, the agent is terminated and cleared from HP or suspended to be used later on. In case 
of the long-term deployment, the agent may reside on the HP and respond to a DSAP client continuously or may 
check the HP environment by invoking events on DSAP client.  
Fig. 2. The concept of DSAP based on the Jini framework 
In Fig. 2., the process of discovery, join and agent communication is shown within the scope of the DSAP 
services. Here, HP discovers LS and joins the registrar object. When a DSAP client (residing in some home 
environment) wants to deploy an agent it searches the LS for the DSAP services conforming the attributes of an 
agent. Commonly, the attributes describe a location of a DSAP service, the capabilities reflecting the actions that 
can be made by an agent using specific Java libraries and an organizational unit that an agent needs to cooperate 
with. This attribute concept can be easily extended using other attribute types. Once an appropriate DSAP service 
was found an agent is uploaded and run in HP environment under the control of the DSAP service. Each agent is 
assigned with globally unique identifier (GUID) before the process of deployment will take place in order a client 
can communicate with specific agent. A DSAP client is able to send messages to agent using GUID and receive 
immediate response, or a DSAP client is notified by firing the events processed by event handler of DSAP client. 
Security mechanism for agent platform is incorporated into the DSAP service using PKI standards with respect to 
security requirements on the agent platform. Moreover, the DSAP relies on a Secure Docking Module (SDM) 
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storage holding private keys and a Trusted Docking Station (TDS) quoting a trusted platform state. The HP, 
deployed within the TDS, is measured by auditing the BIOS and operating system booting sequence measurements 
evaluated as SHA-1 hash values and stored in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The SDM only releases private 
keys if the host platform adheres to a configuration (trusted state) that enforces a key protection policy. The root of 
trust is established between the agents’ home platform and HP by audited agent code before its usage will take 
place. The audit process must ensure that the agent does only what its creator states it should do, and that it does not 
contain any malicious code, which may jeopardize the integrity of the HP. Establishing the trust between an agent 
and a HP is depicted in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3. The scheme of DSAP concept to establish secure and trusted communication of agents 
Agent repository (AR) holds the set of certified agent Java classes or jar files. The code of agents may vary from 
executing simple DB query to complex management of HP resources. It is up to agent designer to implement an 
agent’s functionality, but with respect to the fact that the code must be audited and certified whether by the HP 
provider or by trusted third-party authority. Based on the code certification the HP provider can trust the code 
running his or her HP. When PMS decides to issue an agent, it queries AR to obtain the classes implementing the 
agent. Here, PMS is able to verify the certificate of agent classes. Next, an instance of agent object is created by 
PMS where the agent attributes are set. The agent object and its classes are encrypted using AES key secured by 
TDS1PubKE/D public key (referred to as key wrapping) of HP. After the encrypted agent is moved on the HP, the 
DSAP service decrypts the AES key using TDS1PrKE/D private key of the HP (received from SDM) and uses this 
key to decrypt an agent. The HPs usually provides access to some resources that a specific agent is able to process. 
Here, PMS is responsible for choosing the right type of agent and for setting him up to provide the required results. 
The results are encrypted using the same AES key and sent back to PMS. 
5. Basic platform design and core agents 
The architecture described herein is being used also within an EU integrated project called Secricom [10]. The 
implementation of the architecture in the project is called Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI). SAI addresses timely 
delivery of relevant information, obtains the information about available resources (material or human) and helps the 
authorities manage the distribution of the resources. SAI communicates with legacy information systems operated 
by agencies and institutions involved in crisis resolution. There are several systems to which SAI gets connected. 
We describe the integration with SDM, PTT – Push-To-Talk system and MBR – Multi Barrier Router systems. 
In order to overcome the risks described in section 2.1, agents require safe secured place to store cryptographic 
credentials (PKI secret keys) and provide interfaces to retrieve these keys, ways to attested platform (execute on a 
host platform which is in a trusted state) and provide interface to safely communicate with legacy systems. All these 
functionalities are provided by a SDM hardware module [11, 12]: SDM is a key storage device with local attestation 
and verification capabilities. SDM establishes trust on the host platform where agents are being executed – called 
TDS. A trusted state is a specific software configuration. This software configuration is measured by using a TPM. 
A TPM is a special security chip which provides amongst other functionalities the protected capability of measuring 
the software configuration of its host device. A TPM must be present in the TDS. The combination of a SDM and a 
TDS is called a Secure Docking Station (SDS). 
SAI uses SDS deployed in a physical proximity of the legacy information system, preferably in the same room 
and acts as a secured and trusted extension of the Secricom infrastructure. SAI executed in SDS eliminates the 
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exposure of the legacy IS to the outside world and allows the operator of the legacy IS to have increased trust in the 
information consuming party. SAI can process the information received from the legacy IS while conserving the 
network bandwidth, limiting possible exposure of sensitive data – sending back the results only and continuing data 
processing even if the connection to the outside world is intermittent. More information about these technologies 
can be found in [11, 12]. 
Secricom PTT is a client-server voice and data communication system using IP protocol and is developed by 
Slovak company Ardaco [13]. PTT optimizes and protects the communication of teams without being concerned 
about misuse of information. Regardless of communication endpoint (mobile, laptop or handheld) the 
communication is secure and safe. The communication is based on the SAI connecting to PTT servers in order to 
communicate with users. Concretely UCA agent is being integrated with PTT through using XForm [14] standard 
for user-to-machine interaction. PTT takes care of delivering and displaying the forms on the user side, while UCA 
is responsible for the form processing. Forms are being automatically generated by PMS during run-time in 
accordance to overall process status and process configuration. Integration of UCA with PTT adds a more flexible 
way of data collection and user communication to Secricom infrastructure (see the scheme in Fig. 4.). 
Fig. 4. UCA and PTT communication schema 
The Secricom Multi Bearer Router (MBR) is a modular router development platform and is developed by a UK 
company QinetiQ [15] that delivers the IPv6 network enabling overlay. It provides seamless, ad-hoc end-to-end 
connectivity and emerging next generation, static and mobile bearers, networks and user devices. SAI integrates 
with MBR using the IPA agent. MBR must be equipped with SDS in order to provide trusted and attested execution 
environment for agents. IPA agent is able to configure different properties of network such as communication 
prioritization or bandwidth control between different bearers.  
6. Process management subsystem (PMS) 
Since DSAP platform provide convenient mechanism for secured agent migration within trusted environment, the 
coordination of agents is managed by centralized PMS capable of tracking sequence of actions to achieve specific 
goal. PMS holds ontological description of processes that can possibly occur when some external event is fired. 
Formally, the process P means to execute any possible actions to achieve process goal. The process state or 
context C denotes set of resources available during a process execution. The process goal GP is to execute every 
ending action in the specific process P. Actions templates of the process ATP = {atP1, atP2,…, atPm} hold the set of 
action templates available for execution in the given process P. Action templates prescribe what action will be 
instantiated while fulfilling the preconditions of ATP. Such precondition set PCAT = {pcAT1, pcAT2,…, pcATn}
specifying the set of resources that must be available before the action will be executed. Here, each ATP holds 
references to role of responsible actor RAT, which is mapped to specific actor (person or legacy resource responsible 
for process invocation) later in the deriving process of action instance. ATP also describes the type of its effects EAT
= {eAT1, eAT2,…, eATp} containing the set of activity output types. Each action derived from ATP produces resources 
of EAT (subset of Resource ontological concept) that are stored in C. Agents AG = {ag1, ag2,…, agq} contain set of 
agents that are capable of solving a specific task. Action AP = {aP1, aP2,…, aPr} represents an instance of ATP
coupled with agi zero or more agents while resources PCAT are available in C. Formally, the task of PMS is to 
initiate some process P and to manage execution of actions AP prescribed as ATi in order to achieve the goal GP.
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Initially, PMS searches for initial action templates in ATP, where the precondition is not specified, thus PCAT = 
{}, for each process P and therefore instances of such ATP can be executed without any required resources. For 
every atPi where PCAT = {} the starting action aPi is created. The instances of agents agj, described as EAT in aPi are 
created and deployed in DSAP service in order to communicate with the specific actor matching the role RAT for 
process P. Actually, the PMS will issue the starting agents which contact actors (persons or legacy resources) to 
initiate a process P. In case of communicating with a person, the UCA long-term agent is utilized to query the 
responsible person for initiating the process and in case of communicating with legacy system, the ICA long-term 
agent is sent to HP to check availability of specific resource. Starting agents usually sit in the HP till the required 
resource is made available to initiate process P and update the context C. Since multiple processes can be enacted 
simultaneously, the starting agent is redeployed right after the agent has started a new process. 
If specific process P is initiated, PMS searches every action template in ATP set, where the precondition set PCAT
contains a subset of required resources included in context C, formally expressed as selecting ATP; PCAT C. For 
every found action template atPi the action aPi is created. The instances of agents agj, described as EAT in aPi are 
created and deployed in DSAP service in order to communicate with the specific actor matching RAT for process P. 
Here, agents can be issued as long-term usually for monitoring purposes or short-term requesting immediate 
response. Each agent ai produces resources of type eATi that are included into context C. Each time the PMS changes 
the context C, a new set of ATP is found according to selecting ATP; PCAT C. The PMS finishes the process 
execution P if GP condition is matched. 
7. Use case scenario 
Herein we present a sample scenario in which coordinated information collection using agents takes place. 
Fig. 5. Scheme of a sample crisis scenario 
The scheme in Fig. 5 depicts an imaginary epidemic crisis scenario: A country has a sudden rise in the number of 
people sick from an epidemic flu. There are many infected people and others are suspected to be sick soon. The 
organization responsible for mitigation of epidemic is UVZ. Personally a Chief Officer (CO) at UVZ is responsible 
for such situations. The CO decides to set the warning level to 5. As part of this warning level, UVZ needs to make 
sure that there are sufficient supplies of vaccines in regional UVZ branches (RUVZ). Such information must be 
retrieved from legacy systems of each RUVZ. The CO must delegate this information collection to an officer at 
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another organization called SHR. After the officer at SHR finds out the supplies at individual RUVZ he/she needs to 
delegate the task for distributing additional amount of vaccines to an Officer at SHR Warehouse. Information about 
complement shipments of vaccines to RUVZ is sent by SHR Warehouse Officer directly to SHR Officer who 
redirects this information to the CO at UVZ. For detailed description of the presented scenario refer to [16]. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
In the stage of writing this paper the task responsible for design and development of distributed secure agent 
platform is being finished. We provided the first prototype in January 2010 integrating DSAP platform with AR, 
MBR, PMS, SDM and PTT components. The described architecture was demonstrated on the use case called 
“Swine-flue crisis management” mediating scenario for drug distribution during the pandemic process mitigation. 
The integration with monitoring center is planned using the Java logging mechanism, where the messages about the 
state changes within the DSAP environment are sent to the monitoring center and analyzed. In the future we plan to 
identify other suitable problem domains and to customize the platform for new challenging application domains. 
In this article we have analyzed the requirements for agent-based systems and proposed a distributed architecture. 
We have described the mechanism for selecting and enacting agents deployed in DSAP environment to achieve 
specific goals. We have decomposed our agent architecture to subsystems and identified several core agents to be 
used in an architecture implementation. A sample scenario was described, which demonstrates the possible use of 
individual agents in case of a crisis in a distributed IP-based communication infrastructure. Lastly we sketched our 
achievements using the proposed architecture within an EU integrated project called Secricom and described future 
integration and implementation plans. We believe that beside crisis management there are many other application 
domains where trusted code execution using agents is appropriate to use and where the proposed distributed agent-
based architecture would suit as well. 
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